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INTRODUCTION
The figure of the Arab Jew has historically occupied a space at
the margins of Jewish life, rendered peripheral or even invisible by a
lens trained on the experiences of Jews of European descent.2 Drawing
in part from the academic lineage of Kimberlé Kimberle Crenshaw’s
theory of intersectionality, American Jews of Arab and Middle Eastern
descent (“Mizrahi Jews”) are increasingly joining their Israeli counterparts and Jews of color in the United States in challenging the
naturalization of Jewish whiteness in the popular imagination.3 In a
1. Gabriella Kamran, J. D., University of California Los Angeles College of Law, 2022.
The author would like to thank Sophie Levy, Evan Mateen, and the rest of Zaman’s founding members for their contributions to Iranian Jewish culture and for being exceptionally
cool people. She would also like to thank Professor Cheryl Harris for being a once-in-alifetime educator who teaches with wisdom, humor, and vital purpose.
2. See generally ELLA SHOHAT, ON THE ARAB-JEW, PALESTINE, AND OTHER DISPLACEMENTS (2017) (interrogating the supposed dichotomy between Arab and Jewish identity that
figures in Jewish, Arab-Muslim, and Zionist discourse and exploring the possibilities of
anti-colonial solidarity engendered by the experiences of Arab Jews); see also Leeor Ohayon,
Focusing a New Lens on Mizrahiut, ZAMAN (Mar. 29, 2020), https://
www.zamancollective.com/all-posts/leeorohayonmizrahiut (“When I asked my interviewees
to point me towards what they considered as Mizrahi [Middle Eastern Judaism], I was told
repeatedly to ‘go to the periphery.’”).
3. The author is a member of one such media collective dedicated to centering the
history and culture of Mizrahi Jews. See, e.g., What is Zaman?, ZAMAN, https://
www.zamancollective.com/whatiszaman; Introducing The Jews of Color and Sephardi/
Mizrahi Caucus Working In Partnership with JVP, JOCSM (Aug. 4, 2016), http://jocsm.org/
introducing-the-jews-of-color-caucus-working-in-partnership-with-jvp; Code Switch, Mem-
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striking parallel between this groundswell of community theorizing
and legal strategy,4 the Supreme Court in 1987 decided as companion
cases Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, which held that Arab and Jewish plaintiffs can bring race
discrimination claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 despite both
groups’ contemporary status as “Caucasian.”5 Al-Khazraji and Shaare
Tefila, seminal cases in the judicial construction of race in the United
States, present a singular opportunity for an intersectional critique of
the law’s role in constructing Jewish and Arab identities specifically,
as well as the implications of this construction for race discrimination
jurisprudence generally. In this Article, I argue that the act of reading
these companion cases as a synthesis, rather than discrete cases asking similar questions—an intersection, rather than parallel axes—and
centering the figure of the Arab Jew reveals the cases’ potential to unsettle racial essentialism by way of an intersectional critique of
juridical whiteness.
I. AL-KHAZRAJI

AND

SHAARE TEFILA

ON THE

CONSTRUCTION

OF

RACE

Al-Khazraji is an employment discrimination case interpreting
Section?1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in the making of private and public contracts.6 Majid AlKhazraji, an Iraqi professor, alleged that his employer Saint Francis
College denied him tenure on the basis of his “Arabian” race.7 In
Shaare Tefila, the plaintiff congregation responded to anti-Semitic
vandalism of its synagogue by suing the perpetrators for discrimination against Jews under Section 1982 of the same Act, which prohibits
racially discriminatory interference with property rights.8 Despite
their disparate factual scenarios and statutory causes of action, the
two cases posed the same question to the Court: can a group considered
bers of Whose Tribe?, NPR (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/18/602678381/
members-of-whose-tribe.
4.
While a deliberate theory of the intersection between Jewish and Arab identities
was absent in the plaintiffs’ legal strategy in these cases, Arab and Jewish community organizations did join forces and file legal briefs on one another’s behalf in a relatively rare
showing of inter-communal cooperation. See Al Kamen, Seeking to Expand 1866 Rights Act,
Jewish and Arab Groups Join Hands, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 1986), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/11/20/seeking-to-expand-1866-rights-actjewish-and-arab-groups-join-hands/60ba685a-4e28-4f79-8018-6c4b7a321c60.
5. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 107 (1987). See Saint Francis
Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
6. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604.
7. Id. at 604.
8. Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. 615.
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“Caucasian” in modern understanding bring a racial discrimination
claim against a defendant who is also Caucasian?9 The answer depended on the Court’s definition of Caucasian, and its formulation is
among the Court’s most forthright articulations of race as a legal
construct.
The Court took an originalist approach to statutory interpretation, parsing dictionaries and the Act’s legislative history to arrive at a
definition of race as it was understood in 1866.10 The Court held that
Congress intended the protection of Section 1981 and Section 1982 to
extend to those subject to intentional discrimination “solely because of
their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”11 Drawing from nineteenthcentury encyclopedic sources, the Court concluded that both Arabs and
Jews, whom we might consider distinct ethnic groups today, were indeed considered distinct races at the time of the Act’s passing.12 The
Court distinguished its adopted ancestry-or-ethnicity formulation of
race from the physiognomy-forward “modern scientific theory” of race
contemporaneous to the decision, which, according to the Court and
several of the parties,13 classified Arabs and Jews as Caucasians.14 In
conclusion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in both Al-Khazraji and
Shaare Tefila were entitled to bring their race discrimination claims
against a Caucasian defendant if they could show that they faced discrimination because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics, and not
solely on the basis of national origin or religion.15

9. The Al-Khazraji Court sidestepped the fraught question of whether “same-race” or
“intra-racial” discrimination is actionable under §?1981 by determining that Arabs are not
actually Caucasian for the purpose of a §?1981 claim. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 609-10
(“[P]etitioner submits that the section does not encompass claims of discrimination by one
Caucasian against another. We are quite sure that the Court of Appeals properly rejected
this position. Petitioner’s submission rests on the assumption that all those who might be
deemed Caucasians today were thought to be of the same race when § 1981 became law in
the 19th century. . .”). See generally Enrique Schaerer, Intragroup Discrimination in the
Workplace: The Case for “Race Plus”, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (2010) (observing that
courts lack a coherent or consistent doctrinal approach to racial discrimination cases between members of the same racial group and arguing for a “race-plus” doctrine parallel to
existing sex-plus doctrine).
10. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 618-19.
13. The legal theory advanced by the plaintiffs in Shaare Tefila was that even though
Jews are not racially distinct from Caucasians, the fact that the white-supremacist defendants perceived them as racially distinct was sufficient to bring the claim within the scope of
§ 1982. Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. at 616-17.
14. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 607; Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. at 617.
15. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613; Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. at 615.
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These brief opinions are notable in the canon of race discrimination cases because, among other things, they represent a relatively
high watermark in the Court’s recognition of the socially constructed
nature of race. The Court’s repudiation of a static, essentialized notion
of race is twofold, apparent both in its attention to the historical evolution of racial categories and its specific rejection of a “physiognomic” or
otherwise biological criterion for racial identity.16 Not only did the
Court sketch the shifting contours of the ways in which the United
States has delineated groups of people along racial lines over the centuries, but it also made an explicit finding that the contemporary
understanding of “race as involving divisions of mankind based upon
different physical characteristics” is a modern invention, a figment of
epistemological history.17 The Al-Khazraji opinion’s citation to a definition of race as “a family, tribe, people or nation,” goes further to evoke
an understanding of race that is based in affinity and kinship with a
particular community.18
Notably, Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence in Al-Khazraji to
underscore the indefinite and overlapping boundary between one’s ancestry or ethnicity (race, per the majority opinion) and national origin;
he noted that in the realm of Title VII, ancestry and ethnicity are
sometimes considered synonymous or at least co-constitutive of national origin.19
In the aforementioned respects, Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila
mirror the legal philosophy underlying certain district and appellate
decisions that grapple with the boundaries of actionable racial discrimination in employment under Title VII.20 Although Title VII is a
separate statute from Section 1981 and Section 1982 and does not
16. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S at 613.
17. Id.at 611.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 614 (reasoning that one’s ancestry or ethnicity and national origin are often
“identical as a factual matter: one was born in the nation whose primary stock is one’s own
ethnic group”); see also Sarah Khanghahi, Thirty Years After al-Khazraji: Revisiting Employment Discrimination Under Section 1981, 64 UCLA L. REV. 794 (2017) (arguing that
that § 1981’s outdated notion of race creates a theoretical distinction between categories
such as race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, and national origin in situations where no such distinction exists and advocating for the inclusion of national origin discrimination in § 1981’s
scope).
20. See, e.g., Sasannejad v. Univ. of Rochester, 329 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (W.D.N.Y.
2004) (“A claim based on national origin discrimination is theoretically different from a
claim based on religious or racial discrimination. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances,
the two claims may be so interrelated as to be indistinguishable”); but see Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1027 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination extends only to immutable
characteristics, i.e. “matter[s] of birth, and not culture”).
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share the legislative history from which the Al-Khazraji Court derived
its definition of race, some courts have engaged the same historical and
sociological analysis of the socially constructed nature of race in determining the parameters of a cause of action under Title VII.21
A notable example is the Ohio district court case Perkins v.
Lake County Department of Utilities, in which a defendant employer
accused of disparate treatment on the basis of race (Native American)
attempted to evade the charge by contesting the plaintiff’s Native
American identity.22 After a survey of the various evidence before it
purporting to prove or disprove the plaintiff’s “genetic/hereditary” classification as a Native American, the Perkins court all but abandoned
the task, emphasizing the near impossibility of accurate or objective
racial categorization given the discontinuous, arguably illusory nature
of race itself.23 The Perkins court concluded, similar to the Al-Khazraji
and Shaare Tefila Court, that “ ‘race’ is not a static concept. It lives and
changes according to popular beliefs.”24 In particular, the court described attempts to make a principled distinction between race and
national origin as an exercise in “mental gymnastics.”25 Although Perkins is somewhat of an outlier in the collection of Title VII cases
interpreting the parameters of viable race discrimination claims,26 it is
21. See, e.g., Walker v. Sec’y of Treasury, I.R.S., 713 F. Supp. 403, 405 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(“The historical predecessor to Title VII is the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and therefore 42
U.S.C. § 1981. In fact, in a suit such as this one, the legal elements and facts necessary to
support a claim for relief under Title VII are identical to the facts which support a claim
under § 1981”); Vill. of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Based on
longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, we reiterate that “race” includes ethnicity for purposes of § 1981, so that discrimination based on Hispanic ancestry or
lack thereof constitutes racial discrimination under that statute. We also hold that “race”
should be defined the same way for purposes of Title VII”).
22. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
23. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1271 (“The traditional racial categorizations of Negroid,
Caucasoid, and Mongoloid have been narrowed, expanded, and/or reconfigured by various
social scientists and other disciplines over the years to the point that the very notion of ‘race’
may be deemed illusory.”) (citing STANLEY M. GARN, HUMAN RACES 15 (3rd ed. 1971);
ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 38 (1964)).
24. Id. at 1274 (the Perkins court, like the Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila Court, invokes an understanding of race constituted of a mutual affinity between an individual and a
community).
25. Id. at 1272.
26. See D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: Misperception Discrimination and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 91, 131 (2013)
(describing a trend in which courts require Title VII discrimination plaintiffs to prove their
actual membership in the protected class upon which their claim of discrimination is based,
and arguing that this gloss on Title VII reflects “courts’ longstanding treatment of ‘race and
ethnicity as biological, morphological concepts and discrimination as a reaction to a set of
biologically fixed traits.”); see also D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Take on Workplace Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe
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illustrative of the broad legal implications of the Court’s rejection of
racial essentialism in Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila for the field of antidiscrimination jurisprudence generally.
II. INTERSECTIONALITY, WHITENESS,

AND THE

ARAB JEW

While the Supreme Court’s destabilization of racial essentialism in Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila is most obvious in its explicit
repudiation of a historically consistent or physiologically-grounded definition of race, there is another basis for critical racial analysis implicit
in the holdings: the particular identities at issue in the cases—Arab
and Jew—are both located at the margins of whiteness and at the intersection of race, national origin, and religion. This paper argues that
the Arab and Jewish identities of the plaintiffs are not coincidental;
rather, they demanded the Court’s attention because they exist at a
jagged, unruly seam of the sociological and legal construction of race.
Through the lens of intersectionality theory, the Court’s construction of
race specific to Arabs and Jews provides fertile ground for the examination and potential disruption of the essentialized, single-axis
framework of antidiscrimination law.
The concept of intersectionality was introduced to the legal field
by Kimberle Crenshaw, who analyzed Title VII cases involving Black
female plaintiffs to illustrate what is lost in the traditional single-axis
formulation of antidiscrimination law.27 For Crenshaw, the problem
had two dimensions. First, the insistence in antidiscrimination jurisprudence of limiting claims to discrete, single-axis theories—in her
example, race discrimination and gender discrimination—erases the
experience of people at the intersection of those axes, who experience
discrimination not as the sum of its protected class parts but as a qualitatively distinct mode of oppression.28 Beyond this elision, Crenshaw
argues that the single-axis framework warps our understanding of the
content of protected class categories in favor of its most privileged
members.29 This approach generates a legal construction of discrimination in which, for example, gender discrimination jurisprudence is
Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987, 1026-27 (2016) (identifying the strict immutability doctrine, or the understanding of race as a “static, biological identity. . .marked
by immutable physical characteristics,” is an entrenched and central feature of anti-discrimination jurisprudence).
27. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black
feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id. at 149.
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modeled on the experiences of White women, and racial discrimination
is constructed in the doctrine on the basis of the experiences of Black
men, yielding a monolithic and universalized doctrinal understanding
of class-based discrimination.30
A significant analytic component of Crenshaw’s theory is that
these class representatives’ privileges go unmarked, in that White women’s whiteness or Black men’s maleness is naturalized as a juridical
baseline rather than named as an axis of intersectional identity.31
Devon Carbado has termed this absence of demarcation “colorblind intersectionality,” calling attention to the way in which removing
whiteness from the intersectional calculus “legitimizes a broader epistemic universe in which the racial presence, racial difference, and
racial particularity of [W]hite people travel invisibly and undisturbed
as race-neutral phenomena over and against the racial presence, racial
difference, and racial particularity of people of color.”32
The application of intersectionality theory to Al-Khazraji and
Shaare Tefila may begin with an acknowledgement that the racial
classes in question—Arab and Jewish—were held out for all intents
and purposes as discrete, arguably monolithic universes of experience;
nowhere was there any indication in the companion opinions that
these classes may overlap. To center, the figure of the Arab Jew is
therefore, the first task of an intersectional analysis of the two cases.33
In the pathbreaking article, White Jews: An Intersectional Approach,
David Schraub explains that Jewishness and whiteness—in the sense
of European ancestry and white physiognomy—are conflated in the
public imaginary, thereby erasing the history and experiences of nonwhite Jews.34 That this racial construction of Jewishness as white is
produced both within and without the Jewish community is evident in
the legal dynamics of Shaare Tefila, in which both the Jewish plaintiffs
and the Court maintained a universalized definition of Jews as ostensi-

30. Id. at 140.
31. Id. at 146.
32. Devon W. Carbado, Colorblind Intersectionality, 38 SIGNS 823, 823-24 (2013).
33. I am deliberately refusing the Court’s categorization of both Arab and Jewish identity as unproblematically white in the contemporary racial order. I therefore conceptualize
the Arab Jew as a figure at the intersection of multiple axes of oppression, more than one
deviation away from the Court’s white baseline.
34. David Schraub, White Jews: An Intersectional Approach, 43 AJS REVIEW 379, 381
(2019). Many use the term “Ashkenormativity” to refer to the centering of Ashkenazi
Jews—Jews of European descent—in Jewish institutions and cultural productions. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Katz, Learning to Undo ‘Ashkenormativity’, THE FORWARD (Nov. 5, 2014), https://
forward.com/opinion/208473/learning-to-undo-ashkenormativity/.
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bly Caucasian in the contemporary racial paradigm.35 Even the
ultimate classification of Jews as ethnically and ancestrally distinct36
presumes a coherence that belies the pluralistic ethnic composition of
the Jewish community. This construction is an example of colorblind
intersectionality, in which racial discrimination against Jews is defined by the experiences of those who exist one deviation away from an
unmarked white baseline—white but-for their Jewishness. Similar to
Crenshaw’s theory of the erasure of Black women’s experiences, the
Arab Jew is excluded from judicial racial reckoning.37
Just as Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality38 reveals both
the literal and epistemological exclusion of intersectional identities in
legal constructions of race, bringing the Arab Jew from margin to
center further produces a richer understanding of the social and legal
phenomenon of whiteness. Both Arab and Jewish identity exist in uneasy tension with whiteness, straddling a liminal space of white
privilege—both in the structural and physiognomic senses—and abjection under white supremacy.39 As the Court’s historical analysis in AlKhazraji demonstrates, both the Arab and Jewish communities have
been subject to a process of whitening since the nineteenth century,
folding the groups into the unmarked universal.40 That this assimilation is incomplete is evidenced by the Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila
cases themselves, in which the plaintiffs had to establish themselves
as sufficiently marked to bring a discrimination claim.41 Jewish writ35. See Brief for the Petitioners, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615
(1987) (No. 85-2156); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987). See also
Naomi W. Cohen, Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb: A New Departure in American Jewish Defense?, 3 JEWISH HISTORY 95 (1988) (demonstrating that publications by Jewish
community organizations during the same time period shared the same universalized construction of Jews).
36. Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. at 617-18.
37. See generally Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory:
Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 1253, 1343 (2011)
38. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Post Script: Reflections on a Twenty Year Old Concept, in
Framing Intersectionality 221 (Helma Lutz et al. eds., 2011).
39. Perhaps the best example of the jagged edges of Jews’ assimilation into whiteness
is the insistence of white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups that Jews are non-white
predators of the white race. See, e.g., Eric K. Ward, Skin in the Game: How Antisemitism
Animates White Nationalism, PUB. EYE MAG., Summer 2017, at 9. The ostensible whiteness
of Arabs has been particularly troubled post-9/11. See, e.g., Loubna Qutami, Censusless:
Arab/Muslim Interpolation into Whiteness and the War on Terror, 23 J. ASIAN AM. STUDIES 161 (2020)
40. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 605 (1987); see also Schraub,
supra note 34, at 379 (“The concept of the Jew as even being potentially White is of relatively recent vintage.”).
41. See Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 605 (1987) (permitting § 1982 claim by person of
Arabian ancestry only where he “can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimina-
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ers have adopted terms such as “conditionally white,” “functionally
white,” or “off-white” to describe the uneven incorporation of Jews into
whiteness;42 the same terms might be ascribed to Arabs in the public
imaginary, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11.43
From this particular vantage point at the margins of whiteness,
what can the Arab Jew tell us about what it means to be white under
the law? Schraub notes that Crenshaw’s and Carbado’s project of naming whiteness as a distinct axis of intersectional identity so to
denaturalize it as an invisible baseline for antidiscrimination law is
the foundation of the field of critical whiteness studies.44 This scholarly
pursuit directly counters the law’s tendency to render whiteness
opaque by exposing the constituent parts of power and privilege bestowed by the legal and social classification of whiteness.45 Al-Khazraji
and Shaare Tefila’s process of documenting the pluralistic construction
of whiteness over the centuries maps well onto the rubric of critical
whiteness studies. It is the indeterminacy of the racial identity of the
Arab Jew—a racial amorphousness of such magnitude that it propelled
not one but two cases to the nation’s highest Court—that forced the
Court to lay down a definitive reification of the boundaries of whiteness. In focusing the microscope on whiteness, the Court makes the
momentous observation that the emperor of whiteness has no clothes—
the parameters of what it means to be white, like any other racial category the law tends to recognize as marked and distinct, lives in the eye
(and the legislative power) of the beholder.46 And, perhaps more importantly, the Court’s demonstration of the incomplete assimilation of
tion based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of
his origin”); Shaare Tefila, 481 U.S. at 617 (requiring § 1982 claim by Jewish Caucasian
Congregation to allege not only that defendants were motivated by racial animus, but also
that the animus was directed at the type of group that Congress intended to protect).
42. Schraub, supra note 34, at 379 (citing Nylah Burton, “White Jews: Stop Calling
Yourselves “White-Passing”, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (July 2, 2018), https://forward.com/
opinion/404482/white-jews-stop-calling-yourselves-white-passing/; Tema Smith, “Are Jews
White? American History Says It’s Complicated”, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://forward.com/opinion/417274/are-jews-white-american-history-says-its-complicated/).
43. See generally AMANEY JAMAL & NADINE NABER, RACE AND ARAB AMERICANS BEFORE
AND AFTER 9/11: FROM INVISIBLE CITIZENS TO VISIBLE SUBJECTS (2008) (essay collection exploring whether and how American racial formations—such as the U.S. census
categorization of Arabs as white—can explain the experiences and identities of Arab Americans, including insofar as Arabs and Muslims were demonized as a threat to national
security post-9/11).
44. Schraub, supra note 34, at 386-87.
45. Schraub, supra note 34, at 387 (“By fleshing out Whiteness as a cohesive analytical
category in its own right, Whiteness can be thought of in a textured and variegated
way. . . .”).
46. See Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 610.
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Jews and Arabs into whiteness and the possibility of discrimination
within modern racial categories explodes the doctrine’s traditional presumption, identified by Crenshaw, that “a discriminator treats all
people within a race or sex category similarly.”47 Triangulating Arab,
Jew, and white in this way, the structure collapses on itself.
An intersectional analysis of Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila
would be incomplete without an acknowledgement that Arab and Jewish identities which, in addition to residing at the margins of
whiteness, exist at the intersection of race, national origin, and religion, as they are commonly deployed in the United States. Schraub
writes that Jewishness is “simultaneously national, racial, ethnic, and
religious in character, but not reducible to any of these[,]”48 confounding the attempts of less intersectional-inclined theorists to keep
these axes of discrimination separate. The figure of the Arab, too, carries racial, national, and religious baggage;49 the conflation of these
categories accelerated post-9/11 and reached a feverish apex with Donald Trump’s executive orders limiting travel and immigration to the
United States from Muslim-majority, mostly Arab countries.50 The
awkward juridical attempt to shoehorn Jewish and Arab experiences of
discrimination into one box,51 or one axis—critiqued by Justice Brennan in his Al-Khazraji concurrence as a frequently futile exercise52—
exposes the frayed thread at the seams of racial identity in antidiscrimination law.
III. CONCLUSION

AND

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW

The significance of Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila’s historically
contingent pluralized definition of whiteness for antidiscrimination ju47. Crenshaw, supra note 27, at 150.
48. Schraub, supra note 34, at 389. See also Cohen, supra note 32 (identifying Shaare
Tefila as a paradigm shift in which the organized Jewish community first entertained a
legal theory of Jews as a racial rather than religious group).
49. Abdullahi v. Prada USA Corp., 520 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing
Al-Khazraji by explaining, meticulously, that because the plaintiff’s nation of origin was
Iraq, which is not an Arab country due to its location outside the Arabian Peninsula, any
discrimination he faced for being Arab must necessarily have been on the basis of ethnicity).
50. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
51. The box is literal: Title VII and §?1981 plaintiffs generally must choose from a
checklist of protected bases including race, national origin, and religion when filing a claim.
See Abdullahi, 520 F. 3d at 711.
52. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 618 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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risprudence is hard to understate. In a legal field in which district and
appellate courts are still encountering (and often recognizing) defenses
that mobilize essentialized, genetic definitions of race to evade discrimination lawsuits, these cases provide a legal basis for radically
expanding the opportunities for relief from racial discrimination as it is
actually experienced by people of marginalized identities. Among the
causes of action that may be substantively developed from this intersectional reading of Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila are (1) so-called
misperception cases and (2) the line of Title VII cases that grapple with
the validity of claims of discrimination on the basis of non-biological
but arguably racially-related cultural behaviors such as hairstyles.
Misperception cases involve claims of discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic with which the plaintiff does not
identify; there exists a spate of district and appellate decisions, contra
Perkins, that insist the plaintiff must be a true or actual member of the
protected class upon which they are claiming discrimination.53 D.
Wendy Greene identifies these “actuality requirements” as indicative
of judges’ persistent commitment to a “stable, biological” reification of
race.54 The latter category of cases is best known as the lineage of
grooming cases, in which courts, as a general matter, uphold employers’ appearance policies despite their prescription of normatively
gendered imperatives or prohibition on aesthetic practices generally
associated with a particular racial group.55 The recurring justification
for these decisions is that Title VII’s protections are limited to immutable or fixed characteristics as distinguished from cultural practices.56
Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila’s holdings are directly inapposite
to the racial logic underlying both lines of doctrine. As this paper established in Part I, the cases both directly and implicitly undermine
the illusion of physiognomically determined racial categories to which
the aforementioned courts cling. At the most basic level, the ancestryor-ethnicity definition of race opens the door to variegated claims of
discrimination on the basis of racialized modes of behavior or existence, even if unmoored from a physiological racial anchor. Further, if
membership of an ostensibly singular racial category as we currently
understand them exists uneasily, contingently, and conditionally,
straddling multiple axes of protected identity like the Arab Jew, then
53. Greene, supra note 26.
54. Greene, supra note 26, at 88.
55. See D. Wendy Greene, Splitting Hairs: The Eleventh Circuit’s Take on Workplace
Bans Against Black Women’s Natural Hair in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 987 (2016).
56. Id. at 992.
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the belief in a particular experience or immutable appearance that
unites class members across difference is no longer tenable. The cases
heed Crenshaw’s instruction to shine a blacklight on whiteness, demonstrating how it can move, shadowlike, over a body to conditionally
obscure its social meaning.
The critical understanding of race endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Al-Khazraji and Shaare Tefila must be read as a significant
expansion of the viability of claims under Title VII and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, as well as a substantive confrontation of the body of antidiscrimination doctrine that adheres to the myth of universal,
coherent categories of identity. These cases have the potential to bring
the law into alignment with the lived experience of intersecting and
unruly forms of discrimination and oppression.

